Loss Aversion, cheap capacity and investment in the Energy Game

In our last session of the Energy Game, players responded to a higher uncertainty about demand, and to the introduction of fossil-fuel power plants, with much higher production capacities: Before the uncertainty increase, the average production capacity of a player was about 600 GWh/Rnd Here are a few energy fleet the year after, following an increased uncertainty (same expectations about demand but with a higher variation coefficient: 0.3 instead of 0.15) and the introduction of fossil-fuel power plants. On most markets, total installed capacity exceeds 1400GWh/Round, even though the probability to have a shortage with that capacity is only about 0.6%.   by

Mergers and separate identities

In the last airECONsim session at ENAC, some of the teams decided to merge with robot airlines, and chose to keep a separate control over them. This allowed them to build differentiated offers for customers. On this route, “Air Albi” operates flights with high comfort, while the acquired firm “robot 5 – Air Albi” operates cheap flights with very little space between seats.   by

CO2 Permits, Quotas, Grandfathering and switch to more ecological technologies

These graphs illustrate the evolution of prices, produced quantities and used technologies in the last session of “The Carbon Game”, at Ecole Polytechnique. Each line corresponds to a different market with a specific environmental policy. On “purple” markets, from year 2, fixed (non tradable) CO2 emission permits (quotas) were granted to the firms, and each firm had the same number of permits. On “green” markets, from year 2, emission permits were allocated in proportion to previous year’s sales (but the total amount of permits itself was fixed and independant of the firms’ actions). Banking permits from one year to the next was possible on green markets (grandfathering), but not on purple markets (fixed quotas). From year 4, the amount of quotas decreased by 20% every year. On each market, firms could choose between 2 or 3 different technologies, some emitting less CO2 but being more costly. The general trend on each market over the whole game was not very surprising, at least for the purple markets: Average prices tended to increase, productions tended to decrease, and more and more firms switched to the more ecological technologies as allocated permits got scarcer. More surprising maybe, the fact that nearly no firm […]

CO2 permits with badly designed allocation schemes

These pictures illustrate the evolution of CO2 emissions in one of the games of our last session at Mines Albi and Dauphine University. Each line corresponds to a different market with specific environmental policies. The “light blue” line is a benchmark market over which there is no environmental policy. Without getting into details, from year 6, there are tradable emission permits on the three other markets and the cap (the total number of permits to be allocated) decreases by 80% every year (changes from one market to another bear on allocation specifications such as whether or nor banking is allowed, are the permits sold through auction or allocated for free, on the basis of past production or pollution, or else…) In this first game, all the three policies seem to work pretty well. Still, something interesting is already visible in year 5 (the year just before the introduction of CO2 permits): emissions increase (more or less) in all three markets. So, what happens in year 5? Players are aware that permits are to be introduced the year after, and that the allocation in year 6 will be based on historical data (that + other info about the future of the […]

Demand Data

Useful Data about demand for our market games is available in an excel file: http://economics-games.com/resources/site/doc/marketGamesDemand.xlsx (be careful, this is data for the 5 microeconomics games that are available on economics-games.com, not games from aireconsim.com) Theoretical debriefings can now include numerical activities illustrating decreasing marginal revenue, monopoly pricing, short-run unconstrained monopoly price vs long-run monopoly price, etc… More info (such as demand data in the oligopoly case) is available upon request.   by

Production capacity and competition intensity

These graphs depict industry total profits, average price and industry total production capacities on 4 distinct (but identical) markets (3 players on each market) over 4 years The (negative) correlation between total production capacities and average price is quite spectacular in this “Kreps-Scheinkman type” game. The more production capacity is installed, the more intense price competition is: Which, of course, results in a corresponding (negative) correlation between total production capacity and total profits:   These results are taken from our last session at Mines Albi.   by

Sunks costs, capacity constraints, price and profits

One of the market games studies the impact of sunk costs and capacity constraints on firms’ prices and profits. After a few iterations, prices and profits explode on the market with a very low production capacity sunk costs have nearly no influence on prices fixed avoidable costs may have an impact on price when one of the player leaves the market prices and profits are lower when production capacities are more important   Below is another graph, from a shorter session, illustrating the evolution of prices at the start of the game: In the beginning students usually chose higher price on markets with higher fixed costs, making no distinction between avoidable and sunk costs (yellow and red). They also chose about the same price on the markets with moderate capactity constraints and with very low constraints (blue and pruple). After a few iterations, prices on the market with sunk costs (red) decreased and reached the same level as on the market with no sunk costs (light blue). Prices on the market with very low capacity constraints (purple) decreased much below the market with moderate capacity constraints (light blue). As usual, Prices soar on the market very very strong capacity constraints. […]